Research Operations | Research Compliance & Integrity | Export Control | International Collaborations

International Collaborations

Compliance & Integrity Quick Links

In general, collaborations between university personnel and scholars at foreign institutions or organizations do not require export licenses unless they involve export controlled or restricted research or involve scholars in sanctioned countries. Before engaging in an international collaboration, the university needs to determine if export licenses are required and to verify that the foreign individual and/or organization are not blocked or sanctioned entities.

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US Sanctions in Response to the Invasion of Ukraine

In February and early March of 2022, the U.S. government in coordination with U.S. Allies and partners, imposed severe financial and export control restrictions on Russia and entities supporting the Russian government. These measures are the most comprehensive application of Commerce’s export authorities on U.S. items, including technology, as well as on foreign items produced using U.S. equipment, software, and blueprints, targeting a single nation.

These restrictions are likely to change and may affect current or future University collaborations, agreements, and research projects in these areas.

Sanctions / Restricted Parties

Multiple Russian & Belarus businesses, banks, and individuals are now restricted by the U.S. Government (as well as their supporters), with sanction expansions expected. Conducting business or other activities (including research, which counts as a service) with restricted parties, their subsidiaries or family members may be prohibited or require an export license. Export Control staff can assist in identifying barred parties through Restricted Party Screenings.

Export Restrictions

The provision of services or items that previously did not require a license now require government authorization (with a policy of denial). The export sanctions are intended to restrict high-level technologies that would advance Russia’s defense, maritime, and aviation growth. Many items and technologies subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) are affected, including but not limited to computers, semiconductors, telecommunication, encryption security, lasers, sensors, navigation, avionics, propulsion, aerospace, and maritime technologies. Export Control staff are closely monitoring new license requirements with additional sanctions anticipated.

Please contact the Office of Research Integrity at ori@uncg.edu for guidance if you currently have or anticipate any activities involving individuals, colleagues, businesses, universities, etc. in Russia, the Russian annexed sections of Ukraine, or Belarus such as:

Collaborating on research or other projects

Shipments

Financial transactions

Technology exchanges

Export Control Topics

International Collaborations & Presentations

University activities that involve foreign national faculty, students, staff, visiting foreign scientists or collaborator(s), or other foreign entities (e.g., non-U.S. company, university or other organization) or research that will include travel to international conferences to present unpublished results may be subject to export controls especially if any of the foreign nationals are from embargoed or sanctioned countries.

International Consulting

Providing professional consulting services overseas, especially to embargoed or sanctioned countries (e.g., Iran, Syria, Cuba, Sudan and North Korea) is, in most cases, strictly prohibited.

Enhancing the Security & Integrity of America’s Research Enterprise

The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy has released detailed guidance, along with both case studies and examples, in efforts to protect America’s science, technology, and innovation from foreign threats. Enhancing-the-Security-and-Integrity-of-Americas-Research-Enterprise-June-2020

Collaborations with International Colleagues

Before engaging in an international collaboration, the university needs to determine if export licenses are required and to verify that the foreign individual and/or organization are not blocked or sanctioned entities.

    Some research projects may involve collaboration with scientists who reside outside the U.S. and are citizens of other countries. The information to be shared must be evaluated for possible export control issues prior to the exchange of information, data, technology, software, or equipment. Prior licensing approval may be required.

    In general, collaborations between university personnel and scholars at foreign institutions or organizations do not require export licenses unless they involve export controlled or restricted research or involve scholars in sanctioned countries.

    Before a foreign visitor or visiting scientist is allowed access to a lab or research project, an export control evaluation must be conducted to make sure the foreign visitor does not have access to export controlled materials, equipment, software, or technology that would require prior licensing approval. Release of controlled technology to foreign persons in the U.S. are “deemed” to be an export to the person’s country or countries of nationality and is found in 734.2(b) of the EAR. Typical organizations using deemed export licenses include universities, high technology research and development institutions, bio-chemical firms, as well as the medical and computer sectors.

    Congress held several other hearings this year in which some or all of the focus was concern over undue foreign influence at our universities, particularly from China. Additionally, House and Senate members – both Republicans and Democrats – have taken action related to those concerns. Some illustrative examples include an amendment to the annual defense authorization bill to limit U.S. researcher participation in foreign recruitment programs like China’s “Thousand Talents Program”(this amendment ultimately was not included in the bill); a letter to federal agencies to track institutions that receive funding from Chinese state-controlled technology companies such as Huawei; and letters to many academic institutions urging closure of Confucius Institutes. It is important to note that the concerns come from members of both political parties; this is not a phenomenon of the current administration even though the president has certainly put China in the spotlight.

    The FBI has issued this notice in March 2018 on Chinese risks to academic research.

    PUBLISHING & MARKETING GENERAL LICENSE

    In 2007, OFAC granted a general license that specifically allows for activities in support of publishing and/or marketing of informational materials with sanctioned countries Iran, Cuba, Sudan, and Burma. As authorized under this license, U.S. persons can freely engage in activities that are “necessary and ordinarily incident to the publishing and marketing of manuscripts, books, journals, and newspapers in paper or electronic format…” This general license allows university personnel to participate in any activity that is part of the normal academic peer-review or publishing process. However, it does not allow for these activities to occur if the foreign person(s) involved is a governmental official, or represents or is working on behalf of the government of the sanctioned country. For the purposes of this license, academic and research institutions and their personnel are not considered governmental employees or their representatives.

    It is important to note that this general license does not allow for or authorize the provision of any customized or consulting services. Such activities would still require a separate governmental authorization or license.

    INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS AND VISITORS

    Deemed Exports

    According to the government, the deemed export rule is basically the release of controlled technology and/or information to a non-U.S. person regardless of where the export takes place. A non-U.S. person can be a foreign national, a foreign government entity, a foreign company, a foreign military, or anyone who is not legally considered a U.S person under the terms of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Once technology is released to the foreign national, the U.S. government considers it “deemed” to be an export to the individual’s home country.

    Even the slightest exposure of technology or information to any foreign national can trigger the deemed export rule and cause a violation of U.S. export regulations. Such a release could cause criminal and civil penalties as well as imprisonment for employees involved in the violation.

    Release of controlled technology to foreign persons in the U.S. are “deemed” to be an export to the person’s country or countries of nationality and is found in 734.2(b) of the EAR. Typical organizations using deemed export licenses include universities, high technology research and development institutions, bio-chemical firms, as well as the medical and computer sectors. Note that those organizations having persons with permanent residence status, U.S. citizenship, and persons granted status as “protected individual” are exempt from the deemed export rule. (https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/deemed-exports)

    Many of the licenses for deemed exports involve those conducting scientific research. Note that under 734.8 of the EAR, fundamental research is defined as “basic and applied research in science and engineering where the resulting information is ordinarily published and shared broadly within the scientific community” and, as such, is exempt from EAR licensing requirements. Research conducted using publicly available information is also exempt from any license requirements.

    TOURS & VISITORS IN YOUR LAB

    Before a foreign visitor or visiting scientist is allowed access to a controlled lab or research project, an export control evaluation must be conducted to make sure the foreign visitor does not have access to export controlled materials, equipment, software, or technology that would require prior licensing approval.

    SCREENING FOREIGN NATIONAL INDIVIDUALS AND ENTITIES

    Visual Compliance is the resource currently utilized to screen international visitors who come to UNCG’s campus. Contact the University ECO as far in advance as possible for any international visitors. Additional information on screening activities for export compliance can be found here.

    PROTECTING ACADEMIC RESEARCH

    UNCG values, supports and encourages international collaborations and educational opportunities for our campus community when these activities promote the advancement of the common body of knowledge, support academic freedom, and advance scientific research across the globe. UNCG recognizes that while such activities are encouraged, we must also remain vigilant to current and emerging threats to the security of our research endeavors.

    Concerns about systematic programs of foreign interference at U.S. research universities are being expressed by federal agencies that support research, federal intelligence agencies, federal security agencies, as well as Members of Congress. These agencies are concerned with preventing foreign actors from acquiring or duplicating US federally funded research. For example, both NIH and NSF have issued “Dear Colleague” letters expressing concerns regarding foreign threats to academic research activities, and the DOE issued a memo in December 2018 announcing plans to restrict “international scientific research collaborations that may pose potential risk to U.S. national interests.” These agencies are taking this very seriously; the DOJ is pursuing those who fail to disclose conflicts of commitment or interest.

    Professional organizations have raised similar concerns. The Association of Public Land Grant Universities (APLU) and the Association of American Universities (AAU) have put forward their APLU-AAU Effective Practices Summary for potential policies, procedures, and tools to help academic institutions address these risks.

    Below are some ways in which you can help ensure our research activities are protected:

    Making full and transparent disclosures of foreign relationships and activities consistent with established university expectations and existing practices will help ensure that international collaborations and other global engagement activities are in full compliance with applicable federal and university regulatory requirements.

    • Disclose collaborations with foreign or domestic entities in compliance with sponsor requirements in your proposals and reporting. These collaborations may include exchanges of personnel, materials, or data, or other significant activity likely to result in co-authorship.
    • When you apply for research funding, disclose all ongoing or proposed research projects and sources of support, per instructions in NIH’s Other Support, NSF’s Current and Pending Support, and similar documentation from other sponsors.
    • Disclose financial interests related to your research in all public sharing of your research results -presentations, publications or otherwise.
    • Disclose your outside professional activities and financial relationships through the External Professional Activities for Pay (EPAP) and Conflict of Interest (COI) systems. Such disclosures must include all work for, or financial interests received from a foreign institution of higher education or the government or quasi-governmental organization of another country.

    • When collaborating with international partners, making financial transactions, shipping materials, transferring technology, traveling abroad, or using restricted materials for research, comply with all US export control regulations.

    • Agencies and other entities that fund your work may require advance approval and/or disclosure of foreign travel or domestic travel sponsored by foreign entities. Check the requirements associated with your specific funding sources.
    • When traveling to high risk countries, follow recommendations including the use of clean loaner devices to protect information.

    • Disclose to UNCG all potentially patentable inventions conceived or first reduced to practice in whole or in part in the course of your University responsibilities or with more than incidental use of University resources. Remind your group members and collaborators to do the same.

    • Never share information obtained while going through a peer review processes, whether reviewing grant applications or publications. This information is confidential.
    • Declare all competing or conflicting interests when agreeing to serve as a reviewer.
    • Check the requirements of the relevant agency or journal. If in doubt, disclose or ask.

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